What those who promote “compromise” with Russia don’t understand

Wishful thinking and ignorance are a dangerous combination

There are two main groups advocating for Ukraine to “compromise” with Russia. The first group is the any war is inherently bad and should be ended, even at great cost to the victim. Many in this group know little about Ukraine and Russia and frankly don’t care that they don’t know—they simply oppose war and assume that appeasing Russia, such as ceding Ukrainian territory to it, will lead to lasting peace.

The second group is the “Russia has legitimate grievances” crowd. While they stop short of blaming Ukraine for the war, they place significant blame on NATO and the West, implicitly treating Ukraine as a territory over which Russia has rightful influence. This group supports not only territorial concessions but also commitments to exclude Ukraine from NATO and similar agreements.

Sadly, both of these camps are ignoring at least three big elephants in the room.

The first elephant is that Russia’s goal isn’t simply to annex Ukrainian territory or keep Ukraine out of NATO. Its true objective—effectively stated many times as a precondition for negotiations—is to establish full control over Ukraine through a puppet government. Russia doesn’t aim to annex Ukraine outright; such a move would be fraught with challenges for Putin, given Ukraine’s large population of ethnic Ukrainians, the deep-seated animosity many Ukrainians now understandably feel toward Russia, and the resilience Ukraine has demonstrated. But annexation isn’t necessary for dominance. What Russia seeks to impose is the Belarus model: a government entirely subservient to the Kremlin.

Why does Russia want a subservient Ukraine? One reason could be to secure preferential trade terms, such as cheap wheat, metals, and energy transit routes. But more importantly, Russia wants to prevent the emergence of a prosperous, democratic Ukraine, which poses a direct ideological threat to the rule of Russia’s oligarchs and authoritarian regime. A thriving democracy on Russia’s border risks inspiring its own citizens to question the Kremlin’s grip on power.

Prior to 2014, Russia’s preferred approach to achieving this goal was to pursue the Belarus model—a compliant, Kremlin-aligned government that would suppress democratic movements while maintaining stability. However, when this strategy failed due to the Ukrainian people’s resistance, Russia opted for a second-best strategy: destabilizing Ukraine at all costs. This includes prolonged conflict, economic disruption, and extensive information operations aimed at undermining Ukraine.

With the full-scale invasion of 2022, Putin mistakenly thought he could directly impose a puppet government with an easy “special military operation”. But he clearly underestimated the Ukrainian people. Although the ongoing war is extremely costly for Russia, the Kremlin views it as a necessary price to pay to eliminate the existential threat of a successful, democratic Ukraine.

What the people in the “compromise” camps are therefore implicitly advocating for is the abandonment of democracy in Ukraine. By pushing for concessions, they are essentially endorsing a scenario where Ukraine becomes subservient to Russia, either through a puppet government or ongoing destabilization. Anything short of dismantling Ukraine’s democratic aspirations is insignificant to Russia. Even if Russia agrees to a seemingly lesser compromise—such as territorial concessions or NATO neutrality—it would merely be a tactical pause. History and Russia's own behavior suggest that such agreements would serve as a prelude to further covert or overt aggression, aimed at achieving its ultimate goal: eliminating Ukraine as an independent and democratic state.

The second elephant in the room is that Russia has now placed itself firmly on an imperialist war path. Both camps fail to realistically consider what would happen after any compromise agreement. If Ukraine were to implement any combination of ceding territory, declaring neutrality, drastically reducing its military, or installing a pro-Kremlin government, it would hand Putin a massive domestic victory. He would parade himself as a hero who “de-Nazified” Ukraine, defeated NATO, and “rescued” persecuted Russians in Ukraine. But do heroes ever stop? Of course not. Such a triumph would not satisfy Putin—it would embolden him.

Russia has already spent years stoking unrest in places like Georgia and Moldova, seeking to destabilize other post-Soviet states. A victory in Ukraine, even a partial one, would validate Russia’s strategy and encourage it to push further, expanding its influence and aggression across the region. The lesson for Putin would be clear: his methods work, and the West will ultimately yield under pressure. Putin might even conclude that NATO is weak and unreliable, prompting him to set his sights on Poland or the Baltic states. Rather than bringing peace, compromise would pave the way for greater instability and emboldened Russian expansionism.

So what’s the alternative to “compromising” with Russia and sacrificing democracy and security? It’s holding the aggressor fully accountable for its actions and supporting Ukraine in weakening Russia both militarily and economically, until Russia has no choice but to abandon its claims on Ukraine. This may sound more challenging than it is, which leads us to the third elephant in the room.

The third elephant is that Russia is, in fact, very weak. The only reason it hasn’t been defeated yet is because global aid to Ukraine has been slow and insufficient—just enough to prevent defeat, but not enough to secure victory. This isn’t due to budgetary constraints or logistical challenges, but rather a lack of political will and the fact that Russia has, quite effectively, instilled fear in the world through brazen bluffs and empty threats. But the truth is, Russia is a failing, weak state. Ensuring that it faces the full consequences for its war of aggression is not only just but also the key to achieving lasting peace.